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Using two conceptual frameworks from political science—Kingdon’s (2003) 
multiple streams model and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993)—this case study examines the detailed history of a ma-
jor tuition policy change in Ontario in 2004: a tuition freeze. The paper ex-
plores the social, political, and economic factors that influenced policymakers 
on this particular change to shed light on the broader questions of the dynam-
ics of postsecondary policymaking. The study found that the Liberal Party’s 
decision to freeze postsecondary tuition fees was a function of stakeholder re-
lations, public opinion, and brokerage politics, designed for electoral success. 
The policy implementation strategy was intended to facilitate the cooperation 
and interests of the major institutions. Within the broader policy community, 
student-organized interest groups and other policy advocates were aligned in 
a policy preference, a critical component for successful change.
Résumé
À l’aide de deux cadres conceptuels en science politique, le modèle à volets 
multiples de Kingdon (2003) et le cadre de coalitions de défense de Sabatier 
et Jenkins-Smith (1993), la présente étude de cas examine l’histoire détaillée 
d’un changement majeur en matière de politique de frais de scolarité qui a 
eu lieu en Ontario en 2004 : le gel des frais de scolarité. Le présent article 
examine les facteurs sociaux, politiques et économiques qui ont dirigé 
certains responsables politiques vers ce changement particulier, afin de 
faire la lumière sur les questions plus générales portant sur la dynamique de 
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l’élaboration de politiques en matière d’enseignement postsecondaire. L’étude 
conclut que la décision du parti Libéral de geler les frais de scolarité des 
études postsecondaires relevait de relations avec les intervenants, d’opinion 
publique et de politique de médiation, dans le but de remporter les élections. 
La stratégie de mise en œuvre de la politique visait à faciliter la coopération 
et les intérêts entre institutions d’envergure. Au sein d’une communauté 
politique plus large, des groupes d’intérêt étudiants et d’autres défenseurs de 
la politique partageaient la même préférence politique, un élément essentiel 
à la réussite de ce changement. 
Introduction
In the struggle over ideas of accessibility and affordability, tuition fee policy is an ac-
tive and contested area in Canadian postsecondary policymaking. Recent public attention 
and interest mobilization on tuition fee policy raises important questions regarding what 
is known about provincial policy formation and decision-making processes. Despite wide-
spread changes to government regulatory policies on postsecondary tuition in all Canadian 
provinces, there is little understanding of how postsecondary policies are determined. 
The study of the policy process endeavours to explain causal relationships for policy 
development and adoption—an aim particularly important in the growing area of policy 
and politics in higher education research. Within a context of international calls for further 
scholarship of the policy process in higher education (Enders, 2004; McLendon, 2003; 
McLendon & Hearn, 2003), Canadian scholars have contributed important analyses of 
federal policymaking in postsecondary education (Wellen, Axelrod, Desai-Trilokekar, & 
Shanahan, 2012), and federal influence on provincial postsecondary policymaking (Fish-
er et al., 2006; Fisher, Rubenson, Jones, & Shanahan, 2009; Shanahan & Jones, 2007). 
Others have explored forces influencing policymaking in different Canadian provinces 
(Jones, 1997; Padure & Jones, 2009), some focusing on Ontario specifically (Axelrod, 
Shanahan, Wellen, & Desai-Trilokekar, 2012; Boggs, 2009; Charles, 2011; Constantinou, 
2010; Shanahan, Fisher, Jones, & Rubenson, 2005; Young, 2002). 
In April 2004, a newly elected Liberal government in Ontario announced that postsec-
ondary tuition fees at all public postsecondary institutions would be frozen for two years. 
Through a close examination of this particular case of tuition policy change, this paper 
explores the social, political, and economic factors that influenced policymakers on this 
decision, to shed light on the broader dynamics of postsecondary policy change. This case 
study adds to the scholarship by providing a new policy history: a narrative chronological 
account of one episode of tuition policy formation. The case study describes the temporal 
sequence of decisions, processes, and events, as well as key characteristics of the policy 
subsystem in Ontario (Yin, 1989). My approach is grounded in two theoretical frame-
works: Kingdon’s multiple streams model (MSM) (Kingdon, 2003) and the advocacy co-
alition framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These two policy frameworks 
provide alternative lenses on the policy formulation process; a growing literature com-
bines two or more theoretical models to examine aspects of the policy process, includ-
ing these two models in particular (McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; Mintrom, 2000; 
Ness, 2008). This investigation employs a case study research design. Data were collected 
through systematic investigation, and collection involved two key research tools: content 
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analysis of relevant archival and documentary materials, and interviews. A total of 23 
informant interviews were conducted between September 2011 and January 2012 using 
a semi-structured interview approach. The interviewees were provided anonymity. In-
terviewees were selected for their unique perspectives on and contributions to the policy 
episode. They included senior civil servants, cabinet ministers, interest-group leaders, 
institutional leaders, and researchers; member-checking was employed to verify the final 
policy history and its representation.
Policy Actors in Ontario Policy Subsystem
Student Movement Characteristics
Prior to the early 1990s, organized student interests in Ontario consisted of two pri-
mary student federations: the university student organizations affiliated with the Ca-
nadian Federation of Students (CFS-O), and community college student organizations 
largely affiliated with the College Student Association (CSA). A schism occurred within 
the university federation in 1992. In the face of increasing public and government discus-
sion on alternative approaches to tuition policy at that time, divisions in key values and 
policy goals had become apparent and resulted in a separation into two groups. The On-
tario Undergraduate Student Alliance (OUSA) was formed by student organizations from 
the University of Toronto, Queen’s University, Wilfrid Laurier University, University of 
Western Ontario, University of Waterloo, and Brock University. On the whole, differences 
in deeply held values drove the division, which resulted in a new significant policy actor 
(OUSA) contributing technical information and policy options to the policy community, 
new competition for membership and political attention, and a new factor in brokerage 
politics, or the non-ideological politics of consensus building amongst stakeholders in or-
der to win and maintain office (Brodie & Jenson, 1996). In general, the CFS-O preferred 
political action strategies that involved large-scale student mobilization and action in the 
media to influence public opinion and exert pressure upon decision-makers. The ratio-
nale for these strategies, according to one student activist, was: “the only way that we had 
influence in any meeting of any government was when we could prove that we held the 
hearts and minds of the public . . . we don’t do days of action as a ceremony” (Student 
organization 1, interview, December 6, 2011).
Major Organized Interests
By 2003, a number of important policy stakeholders were influencing postsecondary 
policy in Ontario. The postsecondary system had 18 publicly funded universities and 24 
colleges of applied arts and technology (CAATs), as well as a number of interest groups. 
Table 1 summarizes the resources, views, and influences of the major interest groups at 
the time of the policy episode.
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Table 1. Summary of Major Interest Groups in the Ontario Policy Community, 2003
Interest Group Resources, Views, and Influences
Council of Universities (COU) Formed in 1962, COU comprised the executive heads of each 
of Ontario’s public universities. COU sought a remedy for 
university funding issues and an appropriate balance of cost-
sharing between students and the public. Individual presidents 
called for tuition deregulation, but there was a range of prefer-
ences between institutions on tuition policy options. COU was 
influenced by member views, feedback from key constituen-
cies, internal coalition politics, and internal policy analysis, 
including that of postsecondary finance policy. 
Association of Colleges of  
Applied Arts and Technology 
of Ontario (ACAATO)
Established in 1967, ACAATO represented the province’s 24 
colleges of applied arts and technology. It was generally silent 
on tuition policy, but privately some individual presidents 
called for tuition deregulation. It was also influenced by mem-
ber views and internal policy analysis. 
Ontario Confederation of 
University Faculty  
Associations (OCUFA)
Founded in 1964, OCUFA represented its 27 member faculty 
associations and 17,000 university faculty and librarians. It 
was concerned about affordability and marketization in edu-
cation, and was influenced by membership views and core 
values, which were generally progressive. 
Canadian Federation of  
Students – Ontario (CFS-O)
Formerly the Ontario Federation of Students (OFS), CFS-O 
represented over 235,000 student members in 35 member 
local student unions. Tuition fee issues were the top policy 
priority; the policy goal was tuition freeze or reduction, with a 
long-term goal of eliminating tuition fees. It was influenced by 
membership views, national coalition policymaking, and core 
progressive values. 
Ontario Undergraduate  
Student Alliance (OUSA)
OUSA was formed in 1992 and officially incorporated in 1995 
as the result of an informal alliance of five student govern-
ments. It represented the interests of over 140,000 profes-
sional and undergraduate full-time and part-time university 
students at seven institutions. OUSA’s policy preference at the 
time of the episode was a tuition freeze. It was influenced by 
membership views, its core values and mission, and internal 
policy analysis.
College Student Alliance 
(CSA)
Established in 1975, originally as the Ontario Community Col-
lege Student Parliamentary Association (OCCSPA), the CSA 
represented over 70 percent of all Ontario college students, 
consisting of 17 colleges and 25 student associations with over 
126,000 full-time students. CSA was not particularly active on 
tuition policy. It was influenced by membership views and a 
focus on college access.
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Brief Overview of Antecedent Tuition Policy Decisions
Beginning in the 1960s, the Ontario government had used policy mechanisms to limit 
tuition fee increases through a complex and weighted funding formula for universities. 
New flexibility, referred to as discretionary fees, was subsequently introduced. The pur-
pose of this flexibility was to allow universities access to incremental increases in non-
grant revenue. This incremental change allowed universities to charge higher fees within a 
specified range—one that was gradually adjusted upward. Due to the nature of the weights 
in the formula, increases in the operating grant and increases in the standard tuition fees 
were not necessarily related; the traditional penalty for institutions overcharging tuition 
was an equal reduction in the operating grant, an idea “integral to the arithmetic of the 
formula” (Ontario university 1, interview, November 29, 2011). In 1990, the operating 
grant formula was modified to include a corridor, an element that neutralized some of the 
formula’s sensitivity to changes in enrolments and therefore affected enrolment-driven 
funding entitlements. This element of the formula created “extreme strategic emphasis 
in tuition fees” (Ontario university 1, interview, November 29, 2011), as tuition fees were 
the only major source of revenue that could be strategically manipulated by changing 
enrolment and the mix of programs. The impact of the overall policy mechanism was 
such that, even with the incremental changes over time, the funding formula largely kept 
all fees within a relatively narrow band, with little institutional differentiation on tuition 
(Boggs, 2009). In addition to constraining tuition fee levels, the formula funding process 
also limited system capacity at a time when demand for access was increasing. This re-
sulted in a highly competitive environment for student seats, an “enrolment squeeze”; the 
consequent parental and student anxiety over postsecondary access was widely covered 
in the media (Lewington, 1993a). 
In response to these impacts, institutions and their representative organizations 
sought a remedy for ongoing funding problems; this took the form of appropriate cost-
sharing between students and the public and addressing problems with the financial aid 
system. Advocacy for this remedy was sustained for a number of years. By the early 1990s, 
as a result of enrolment pressures and in the face of stagnating government funding, uni-
versities in particular advocated for increased tuition levels (Young, 2001) and attempted 
to find creative solutions to circumvent these constraints, including new experiments in 
the delivery of cost-recovery programs (Lewington, 1993b). Jones (1991a) noted that a 
growing number of institutions called for more market-driven fees or greater flexibility in 
establishing tuition levels to address the universities’ financial needs. 
In 1995, the Progressive Conservative Party was elected to majority government un-
der Premier Mike Harris, with an election platform proposing significant change—in par-
ticular, to address the provincial government deficit and the size of the public sector. 
Ontario’s Minister of Finance announced subsequent changes in postsecondary policy, 
including (i) major cuts to government grants that funded postsecondary institutions and 
(ii) partial tuition fee deregulation. As a result of an increasingly difficult fiscal environ-
ment, enrolment pressures, and lobbying from institutions, the provincial government 
allowed greater tuition increases than had previously been entertained under the funding 
formula policy, with information that suggested fees could be increased without “hurting 
accessibility” (Ontario civil service 1, interview, November 23, 2011). The expanded free-
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dom for universities and colleges to set tuition fees permitted limited tuition increases; in 
addition, tuition fees for international students became entirely deregulated. Further, a 
proposal originally from OUSA was adopted system-wide: the tuition set aside, whereby 
institutions were required to allocate 30 percent of tuition revenue above a base level of 
fees for need-based financial aid. President Robert Prichard of the University of Toronto 
has been credited with the successful lobby for “the freedom to raise tuition fees” under 
the Progressive Conservative government (Galt, 1995). 
The Advisory Panel on Future Directions for Postsecondary Education, chaired by Mr. 
David C. Smith, was appointed in July 1996 by the Minister of Education and Training to 
recommend the most appropriate sharing of costs among students, the private sector, and 
the government, and to find ways to best achieve this. Its report, Our Themes: Excellence, 
Accessibility, Responsibility, was delivered in December 1996. It recommended a signifi-
cant change in the way the system should be resourced. The recommendations included 
changes in funding approaches and tuition fee policies, with increased responsibility for 
setting fees shifted to the universities and colleges, greater institutional flexibility to de-
termine fees at the program level, and conditions within which this flexibility would be 
permitted. The report was seen to give universities much of what they had lobbied to 
receive for over a decade; President Prichard of the University of Toronto described the 
report as “the best document in 25 years on universities and colleges” (Lewington, 1996), 
a view not universally held by other system stakeholders.
As a result, in May 1998, the Ministry established a new tuition policy for the prov-
ince’s universities and colleges. The policy introduced, amongst other changes, limited 
deregulation of tuition fees for graduate, some undergraduate, and professional programs 
at the universities, as well as for select college programs, with some conditions; Boggs 
(2009) includes a detailed description. The new tuition policy adjustments provided a new 
cost-recovery fee, which gave institutions the opportunity to disconnect specific programs 
from the funding formula process, and as a result have institutional autonomy in setting 
tuition fee levels. This policy allowed universities to set tuition in professional programs 
(medicine, law, business, dentistry, optometry, pharmacy, veterinary medicine) and all 
graduate programs, while colleges could set fees in post-diploma and high-demand spe-
cialist programs, if the colleges met other accountability requirements. The universities 
with professional schools were seen to benefit from this policy change the most (Lewing-
ton, 1998). Predictably, these changes were not universally welcomed; student and faculty 
groups, in particular, voiced concern over the shift away from a publicly funded system 
(Toronto Star, Editorial, 1998). In the face of ongoing problems with the funding for-
mula, the Council of Universities (COU) continued to press government to further allow 
institutional autonomy over fees, repeating the organization’s position: “deregulation is 
something universities support. Institutions want to set tuition fees” (Chung, 2001, p. A2).
The institutional impacts of the changes to the funding formula varied, depending 
on enrolment and program mix contexts, but, as a whole, by 2003 these impacts had in-
creased pressure on government to fix the overall postsecondary financial model and stu-
dent financial-aid system. Tuition policy was one aspect of a greater whole. These shifts, 
combined with changing enrolments and significant cuts to government grants to institu-
tions, put greater pressure on tuition fees at the institutional level and focused the ongo-
ing funding formula discussion problems upon tuition policy. Amongst members of the 
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policy community as well as the general public, there was a sense that some institutions 
had been “overly aggressive” and “opportunistic” and taken tuition increases too far—well 
beyond the support of public opinion.
Liberal Party Policymaking
As early as 1998, the Ontario Liberal Party was preparing for the 1999 provincial elec-
tion and leading in public-opinion polls. A senior party strategist told the Globe and Mail 
that the “new agenda for Ontarians is health care and education” (Rusk, 1998); the Liber-
als saw themselves winning the next election “if they [could] make it a fight about health 
care, education and Premier Mike Harris” (Rusk, 1998). Drawing lessons from their loss 
in the previous election, the Liberals began actively meeting with stakeholders to for-
mulate policy and prepare their next campaign. The final policy platform was designed 
to signal the centre-left orientation of the party’s political commitments to tackle social 
programming broadly. The values of the traditional Liberal Party emphasized that the 
“government has a public-good and a common-good interest to serve” (Ontario cabinet 
minister 1, interview, December 2, 2011). In terms of electoral politics, considerations 
included individual riding vulnerability and gathering momentum away from the NDP 
with competitive social policy positions. This was compounded with a further desire to 
attract the youth vote and increase youth party membership; a tuition freeze promise 
was important to build key alliances with those constituencies. The election platform had 
to appeal to the middle-class voter, garner support from the major unions, and, in retail 
politics terms, have sufficient political appeal in its differentiation from the previous gov-
ernment’s policies.
Under Mr. Dalton McGuinty’s centralized leadership, the party worked carefully to 
build a positive relationship with stakeholder groups across many sectors, and brokered 
a coalition of those disenfranchised from influencing post-secondary policy by the Con-
servative government. Mr. McGuinty was sensitive to the views of the CFS-O and OUSA, 
also echoed by the OCUFA, who were critical of tuition increases and promoted increased 
public investment. Mr. McGuinty made his presence known to student groups. He also 
had a strong personal policy focus and interest in education. The coalition of interest 
groups brokered by the Liberal Party included the transfer of political staff and assets 
from the federal Liberals and the Peterson Liberal government, and cultivated significant 
social interlocks with student politics and interest groups. 
Another important aspect of coalition building involved the public sector more broad-
ly, and specifically postsecondary institutions. The Liberal Party made it clear that they 
intended to create allies to strengthen public services; the political strategy to accomplish 
this was set in the leader’s office with his senior advisors. Courting the support of insti-
tutions was a complex process, given that there were very different policy preferences 
amongst the university presidents. Some institutional presidents were in favour of tuition 
price controls, either because they believed that their markets were tuition price-sensi-
tive, or they had values rooted in affordability and accessibility, or they were apprehensive 
of the internal politics and consequences of a deregulation episode in their institutions; 
some were motivated to keep tuition low, as they felt they could perform better financially 
on volume rather than price. On the other hand, other presidents were on a mission to 
substantially increase fees and supported high-tuition/high-aid policies. Notwithstand-
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ing the diversity of views that COU members held on specific tuition policy directions, the 
COU maintained a stated preference for institutional autonomy. In the context of those 
differences, the Liberals proposed a temporary tuition freeze, with promises to fully fund 
the offset of the cost of that freeze to institutions, combined with a promise of a compre-
hensive policy review. This proposal was welcomed by the institutions, as it provided a 
predictable environment for financial and enrolment planning for two years. This was 
perceived to be an election-oriented position rather than a sustainable or rational policy 
direction. The particular strategy to fund the tuition offset was a significant financial com-
mitment, intended to neutralize university opposition and facilitate cooperation with the 
major institutions and their interests for the short term, and the promise of formal policy 
review gave institutions hope that the ongoing difficulties with the overall system of post-
secondary finance would be resolved. 
The institutions were friendly to the idea of a commission; Ontario had a long history 
of commissions in postsecondary education (Clark & Trick, 2006). The tone and signals 
from the Liberals were consultative, particularly in contrast to the previous government. 
The universities believed that the “real” tuition policy decisions would be shaped by the 
upcoming commission, and, as a result, they directed their lobbying efforts at influenc-
ing the commission’s agenda. In particular, the universities felt tuition policy was receiv-
ing disproportionate public attention compared to the complex “real issues” that they 
wanted to ensure were addressed: student financial aid; the funding model, which was 
increasingly insensitive to enrolment changes; and longer-term reliability and predict-
ability from the funding environment to create higher certainty for university planning. 
There was frustration that, in the overall complex policy structure to support student ac-
cess to postsecondary education, there was a tendency to focus on tuition policy rather 
than student financial-aid reform.
The CFS-O and the OUSA were united in their criticism of existing tuition policy and 
were in rare alignment in support of a tuition freeze. Both student groups and the OCUFA 
were lobbying the political parties; because Mr. McGuinty was sensitive to student con-
cerns, organized student interests were seen as “a very powerful special interest group” 
(Ontario university 1, interview, November 29, 2011). With their goal of zero tuition, and 
the interim goal of a tuition freeze, the CFS-O worked with the Liberal Party from Sep-
tember to December 2002 to help shape the platform, meeting with individual members 
of parliament and, in doing so, generating pressure on the party leadership from below. 
Quality, access, and affordability were OUSA’s concerns leading up to the 2003 election, 
and OUSA was publicly supplying the policy community with policy research on the is-
sues of tuition and financial aid. 
On January 30, 2003, the Liberal Party released its election platform on postsecond-
ary education, which included a commitment to re-regulating all tuition fees, fully fund-
ing an immediate freeze, and conducting a review of the postsecondary system. On the 
day of the platform release, Mr. Joel Duff of the CFS-O issued a media release supporting 
the policy and validating the platform, referencing the Federation’s repeated calls for a 
tuition fee freeze as a “first step towards undoing the damage to access caused by double-
digit fee hikes during the tenures of Premiers Harris and Eves . . . an important response 
to the crisis of accessibility at our colleges and universities” (CFS-O, 2003, January 30). 
The Federation was expecting an election within months and was committed to mak-
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ing access to education a central issue. From the institutions’ perspectives, the Liberals’ 
commitment to freeze tuition was not a full policy commitment, but rather a temporary 
“pause” until formal policymaking could be undertaken. Given that perspective, institu-
tions were receptive to the policy commitment and redirected their efforts to the larger 
policy agenda, including matters of policy implementation and the calculation of financial 
offsets, in particular. 
The commitment to a tuition freeze as part of the electoral platform was “a Premier’s 
office decision” (Institutional president 2, interview, December 1, 2011), supported by 
“the brain trust of the political advisors” (Faculty organization 1, interview, December 7, 
2011) with Minister Mary Anne Chambers responsible for implementation and “manag-
ing stakeholders” (Student organization 4, interview, January 17, 2012). Within the Lib-
eral Party, there was a relatively high degree of consensus on the goal to pause policymak-
ing on postsecondary education. The Liberal Party leadership had two goals specific to 
electoral considerations: first, to create an attractive and progressive electoral platform, 
and second, to build a supportive coalition of interests. These goals were informed by 
a sincere commitment to accessible and affordable postsecondary education. This com-
bination of “philosophical commitment and political reality” (Institutional president 2, 
interview, December 1, 2011) was expected to have political appeal: “the decision around 
tuition was a political get-elected decision, but that doesn’t mean there wasn’t pressure 
from students and pressure from the system” (Institutional president 1, interview, De-
cember 9, 2011). From the Liberal Party perspective:
It really was part of the art of politics. In implementing the freeze, we made it very 
clear to the sector that we were their friends. We were going to look at what needed 
to be done to strengthen the sector. We were not going to continue the legacy of 
the Harris-Eves cutbacks, so we did it on the basis of hope. (Cabinet minister 2, 
interview, December 5, 2011) 
From another cabinet minister’s perspective, “a powerful policy on postsecondary educa-
tion tuition helps us with our core voters, middle-class families, middle-class women” 
(Cabinet minister 1, interview, December 2, 2011). 
The Liberals were determined to differentiate themselves from the Conservative gov-
ernment, whose postsecondary policies were falling out of public favour. The creation of 
a winning electoral platform was informed by several considerations, including several 
individual riding vulnerabilities, the need to gather momentum away from the NDP with 
competitive social policy positions, and a desire to attract the youth vote and youth party 
membership. Although electoral politics was a major factor in the choice of the tuition 
freeze as a platform policy, the tuition freeze itself was an important but minor com-
ponent within a larger overall platform; policymakers were somewhat skeptical of there 
being a strong link between postsecondary policy and electability, but they wanted to 
accomplish something politically progressive and positive for the postsecondary system. 
Further, it was also important to the party to build relationships with the institutions 
and interest groups, and in particular to build relationships with potentially vocal stu-
dent groups. The various stakeholders in the policy community had a rare occasion to be 
relatively aligned in their policy positions, at least for the short term. The Toronto Star 
reported that
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the first tuition freeze in Ontario history has sparked an odd honeymoon between 
Queen’s Park and the province’s colleges and universities, after a decade of tur-
moil. The very student unions that for years have slammed Ontario’s shrinking 
post-secondary grants yesterday traded protest signs for pro-government cheers 
over the two-year freeze unveiled by Mary Anne Chambers, Minister of Training, 
Colleges and Universities. (Brown, 2004, p. A17)
Minister Chambers commented that “we know this freeze is primarily a symbolic move 
. . . so now we want to consult with students, parents, industry, colleges and universities 
about developing a long-term plan” (Brown, 2004, p. A17). The institutions’ goal was for 
government to address the larger and more complex policy questions in the system, and 
the tuition freeze policy was accommodated to achieve longer-term objectives. Student 
stakeholder groups, including OUSA and the CFS-O, regarded the tuition freeze as a vital 
commitment supporting their goals of accessibility and affordability. 
The Liberal Party leadership also had a non-electoral goal with the tuition freeze: to 
obtain some space and time for the whole postsecondary portfolio to be reviewed. The 
tuition freeze policy was regarded by both elected officials and civil servants as a “pause” 
rather than a policy commitment, in order to support a longer, deeper discussion about the 
higher education system (Ontario senior civil servant 1, interview, November 22, 2011). 
In this light, many in the policy community regarded the tuition freeze as a non-decision, 
a politically popular but temporary strategy for buying time so that actual policymak-
ing could be undertaken; “there was a genuine desire to pause the system and rethink 
it in view of the impact of deregulation” (Student organization 2, interview, December 
1, 2011). In this light, the freeze was explicitly tied to a review of the higher education 
system; “it was a freeze for the purposes of having a longer, deeper discussion about the 
higher education system in Ontario before any future decisions are made on what’s going 
to happen with fees” (Student organization 3, interview, December 15, 2011). The com-
mitments were seen to be reasonable and were generally supported, particularly as they 
gave policymakers “a chance to catch up with where policy decisions have taken us” (Stu-
dent organization 3, interview, December 15, 2011). Members of the CFS-O believed that 
the tuition freeze commitment was not limited to a two-year period, based on the Liberal 
Party’s response to the Federation’s pre-election questionnaire; however, the majority 
of research participants interviewed clearly understood that the freeze was a short-term 
commitment, a “temporary gesture” (Cabinet minister 1, interview, December 2, 2011). 
Heading into the election, the public mood appeared favourable to a change in gov-
ernment. The Conservative government was weakened by both internal party issues and 
diminished popularity with the public. The party suffered from an uninspiring leadership 
race (“McGuinty’s opening,” 2002) and significant internal conflict (Urquhart, 2002). 
The public was increasingly critical of the Conservative government, perceiving a war on 
education and witnessing widespread labour relations conflicts with public sector unions, 
as well as several high-profile incidents that undermined public confidence in the govern-
ment (Urquhart, 2002). In contrast, public opinion was quite favourable towards the Lib-
eral Party. According to the Toronto Star, the Liberals had put together a platform that 
was “solid, substantive, and affordable,” and Dalton McGuinty was “presenting himself as 
a well-prepared alternative” (Goar, 2003, p. A18). 
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Tuition policy was raised as a political issue during the election. Public opinion polls 
showed that the public felt tuition fees were too high and deregulation had gone on long 
enough; the public mood was that cuts in the public sector had hurt the quality of life in 
Ontario, and services needed to be restored. On tuition policy, amongst members of the 
policy community as well as in the general public there was a sense that some institutions 
had been overly aggressive and opportunistic under tuition fee deregulation and taken tu-
ition increases too far, and therefore were provoking a need for a political and regulatory 
response (“We must freeze tuition fees and offer more financial aid for students,” 2003, 
p. A26). Institutions were concerned about the overall financing of the system and the im-
pact of a potential tuition freeze on their operations, including quality. In an op-ed titled 
“The Politics of Tuition,” Principal William Leggett of Queen’s University called upon the 
political parties to clarify their platforms:
Parties must come clean on how much freezes or rollbacks will really cost the uni-
versity system . . . Until our political parties clearly spell out a full and meaningful 
platform for guaranteeing that the quality of the post-secondary education provided 
in Ontario is consistent with that provided in other provinces and in leading univer-
sities elsewhere in the world, the current campaign flourishes with regard to tuition 
policy must be judged for what they are—mere politics. (Leggett, 2003, p. A21).
The Liberals made campaign commitments for action they would take during their 
first 90 days in office, including addressing auto-insurance premiums, compensation 
for victims of a tainted-water disaster, and class sizes in primary education. The Liberal 
leader reportedly wavered briefly on his platform commitment to the tuition freeze, given 
increased concern about the province’s projected deficit—anticipated to reach two billion 
dollars (Galloway, 2003); however, that promise was quickly reaffirmed under question-
ing by the CFS-O (Benzie, 2003).
The election held on October 2, 2003 returned a significant victory for the Liberals; 
the party had been successful in building a broad-based coalition of support amongst a 
diverse set of voters, having “pried away from the NDP a lot of the unions . . . teachers’ 
unions, auto workers, all to the Liberals, along with their traditional base of Toronto, 
the ethnic Canadian vote, Catholic vote, Franco-Ontarians” (Ontario senior civil servant 
3, interview, November 30, 2011). The Globe and Mail outlined Premier-designate Mc-
Guinty’s timetable for government transition on October 3, 2003; announcing plans to 
freeze university and college tuition was fifth on a list of 30 (“The Liberal timetable,” 
2003). The freeze was again signalled in the Throne Speech of November 20, 2003. The 
Toronto Star reported that the institutions’ compensation for the tuition freeze was to be 
announced by February 29, but a “tangled cabinet debate delayed the decision” and “at 
one point, the Liberal government contemplated back-tracking on its promise,” but Pre-
mier McGuinty reportedly personally rejected that proposal, and the compensation plan 
proceeded (Brown & Benzie, 2004, p. A7). 
In April 2004, the Ontario government announced an immediate two-year freeze on uni-
versity and college tuition for both undergraduate and deregulated professional programs, 
with funding to institutions to compensate for revenue lost in the first year of the freeze 
(Campbell & Alphonso, 2004). The “first tuition freeze in Ontario history” received attention 
for the “unprecedented show of co-operation” between the CFS-O and government (Brown, 
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2004, p. A17). The Globe and Mail expressed reservations about the “political” decision: “it 
chose a quick political fix that fixes nothing” (“Tuition on Ice,” 2004, p. A12). 
Following the decision to freeze tuition, and responding to the significant need for 
policymaking in the larger postsecondary policy context, on June 8, 2004, the govern-
ment announced the promised comprehensive review of the design and funding of On-
tario’s postsecondary education system, to be led by former NDP Premier Bob Rae and 
supported by a seven-member panel. The overall objective of the review was to provide 
realistic, evidence-based recommendations to be implemented with the Ontario Budget 
2005. In particular, government was looking for strategies to improve higher education 
by providing recommendations on: system design; funding models; the appropriate shar-
ing of the costs of postsecondary education among the government, students, and the 
private sector; and the related questions of an effective student assistance program that 
would promote increased access to postsecondary education. Following the completion 
of the commission, the government introduced a new five-year tuition policy framework 
that re-regulated all programs but permitted some new tuition flexibility (Boggs, 2009). 
Conclusion
The antecedent policy history in Ontario set the conditions for policy change, as tuition 
prices under deregulation provoked the need for a political and regulatory response; as a 
result, tuition policy had the potential to become useful in retail and coalition politics. The 
Liberal Party leadership had two goals in the tuition freeze commitment, specific to electoral 
considerations: first, to create an attractive and progressive electoral platform, and second, 
to build a supportive coalition of interests. In the problem stream, there was increasing pub-
lic awareness that the cost of postsecondary education was out of step with (i) expectations 
and other provinces, (ii) institutional concerns about the funding formula and related pol-
icy issues, and (iii) Liberal strategy in preparation for an upcoming election. In the politics 
stream, the Liberals needed to differentiate themselves from the previous government and 
broker a coalition for electoral support; this involved developing a simple progressive policy 
that would resonate with the electorate and be consistent with the party’s overall approach. 
In the policy stream, there was tuition freeze entrepreneurship from the student organiza-
tions; within the Liberal Party, a policy proposal emerged that suggested the tuition freeze be 
a pause on policy development. With the election victory as a key event, the Liberals moved 
to fulfil their platform promise by implementing the tuition freeze. Critical components of 
policy change were the student policy entrepreneurs, who were successful in agenda-setting 
the terms of debate and in moving tuition fee policy onto the decision agenda.
From an advocacy coalition perspective, both student and faculty interests were 
aligned in supporting the tuition freeze policy, and the university coalition was weakened 
by a lack of internal cohesion on policy preferences. Other changes in coalition activity 
included shifts of traditional alliances between progressive, organized interests and the 
NDP to the Liberal Party, and increased coordination between student organizations to 
achieve a common policy goal; these occurred within a larger context of changing public 
mood and government. In the ACF framework, policy learning is a key component for 
understanding policy change. First, having learned from previous attempts to form gov-
ernment, the Liberal Party took steps to better cultivate stakeholders in electoral platform 
development, drawing lessons from previous experience in brokering coalitions within 
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Ontario’s postsecondary policy community. Organized interests provided political sup-
port in exchange for policy commitments from the party. This political support included 
public policy and party validation, support for voter mobilization, and volunteers. Second, 
the Liberals were attuned to the recent history of political protest in Ontario, which in-
cluded several key events of mass mobilization and demonstrations of coordinated, orga-
nized interests. These mobilizations, and the unpredictable influence strategies employed 
by student groups in particular, presented potential political problems; bringing these 
particular organized interests into a political coalition served to mitigate that risk. Finally, 
drawing lessons from other episodes of significant policy change, the Liberals sought to 
facilitate university cooperation by committing to fully fund the cost of the freeze, provide 
a predictable planning environment for two years, and address their primary desire for a 
comprehensive policy review. 
It has been observed that scholars in higher education have tended to frame policy 
decisions in terms of system design, reflecting a strategic management conception of poli-
cymaking and assuming that policymaking is a technical exercise (Warne, 2008). Find-
ings in this case of policy change show evidence that politics affects policy; it has a critical 
role to play in policymaker perception and the framing of policy problems, as well as in 
informing the selection of policy options. In this particular policy episode, for many policy 
actors, “frozen” tuition framed the policy problem in terms of affordability and acces-
sibility, emphasizing the importance of minimizing costs to students and their families 
in the broader goal of increasing participation rates generally, and the participation of 
low-income students in particular. However, this case study shows that for policymakers, 
tuition policy—in this case, a tuition freeze—can serve important political functions far 
beyond stated educational and social goals. 
Some lessons can be drawn regarding current scholarship on postsecondary policy-
making. There is an important and underdeveloped field of analysis in Canadian postsec-
ondary policy studies, the specific dynamics of agenda-setting, alternative specification, 
Table 2. Summary of Primary Factors Found to Influence Policy Change 
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and decision making. In a recent American study, Conner and Rabovsky (2011) found that 
the increased use of theoretical frameworks from political science and public policy has 
been “instrumental in pushing the boundaries of educational research” (p. 105); there is 
a need to push Canadian postsecondary policy studies forward to fulfill our potential con-
tribution to improved democratic participation in the overall governance of postsecond-
ary education. The often missing factor of the practice of politics is a critical component 
of that scholarship; without further empirical analysis of these particular dynamics of 
policymaking, advocates and postsecondary system stakeholders will struggle to advance 
their policy interests in uncharted territory. 
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